New Tools for New Challenges: Toward a Community of Practice for NGO Fragile States Risk Assessment and Conflict Analysis

A full day workshop initiated by Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC)

Carleton University
Senate Chamber (608 Robertson Hall)
October 26, 2007

Welcome Address

The workshop began with an introduction from David Carment to introduce the utility of fragility as an organizing concept for understanding entry points for prevention, particularly in the context of recommendations for policy making. He explained that CIFP has moved from classifying states according to degree of fragility alone, and now considers three characteristics of a state: authority, capacity and legitimacy. Authority refers to the ability of the state to enact binding legislation over its population and to provide the latter with a stable and safe environment. Legitimacy refers to the extent to which the governing regime enjoys public loyalty and support for legislation being passed and policies being implemented, along with international recognition of that support. Capacity refers to the power of a state to mobilize public resources for productive uses. CIFP research finds that states with low legitimacy scores do not typically show up on conventional lists of failed states, which tend to instead focus on states that experience conflict, challenges to authority and low capacity. Understanding that states become weak – and then fail because of low legitimacy and not just weak authority and capacity –will better inform our policies towards fragile states. ¹

Despite its importance as part of the international policy discourse, the idea of state fragility remains an elusive concept, difficult to quantify and to evaluate. Definitions by different organisations identify 30 to 50 fragile states, many of which are or have experienced protracted conflict. Collectively, they represent a significant portion of the world’s population at risk of not meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals. Given the high cost (for themselves and their neighbours) of countries that fail, it is important to understand how states become fragile and why, especially if development assistance is to have a measurable and positive impact on fragile states.

¹ The OECD defines fragile states as “countries where there is a lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies.” Others such as DfID and USAID use the term fragile states to refer to a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states, admitting that the distinction among them is not always clear in practice; they also identify states that are vulnerable from those that are in crisis, and report that about a third of the world’s population now lives in areas that are fragile. The World Bank, on the other hand, focuses its attention on 30 low-income countries under stress (LICUS) that are characterized by a combination of weak governance, policies and institutions, and ranked among the lowest on the Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA); the 30 LICUS countries comprise about half a billion inhabitants.
In this regard, the term *failed states* is problematic. By focusing on end states and in particular those brought about by violent events, our ability to anticipate earlier turning points or those stages where a fragile state might or might not fail before experiencing violent conflict is held back. For example, using CIFP data we know that Pakistan has been a fragile state for some time now, yet according to some research programmes Pakistan is categorized as failing only after it experiences violence and instability. Arguably, once a country like Pakistan enters into “failed state” status it is simply too late to do anything but shore up existing institutions and structures, no matter how weak or corrupt they are, as a bulwark against further decline. This “shoring up” of authority structures then results in a vicious cycle of further decline where both capacity and legitimacy are undermined and in turn authority is further challenged. The claim being made here is that misdiagnosis has the potential to lead to the misallocation of policy resources, which in turn can lead to ineffectiveness and further state decline.

Fragility and failure are analytically distinct. While they share some properties, they differ in the degree to which they emphasize the roles of armed conflict and instability in contributing to state weakness. This distinction is especially pertinent to donor countries whose policy tools have been redesigned to extend beyond operational responses (e.g. the use of force and diplomacy to prevent or mitigate violence and instability) and are intended to shore up structural weaknesses and guard against further neglect, which could in turn result in even greater fragility and possibly failure. Implicitly in CIFP’s conceptualization of state fragility, we recognize that states become fragile and fail for different reasons and that they are qualitatively different from one another, with unique problems that often require distinct policy responses.

**Keynote Address: Prevention and Rebuilding of Weak States: Obstacles and Opportunities**

Michael Lund’s keynote presentation began with an overview of the three levels of assessing fragility: global risk (where fragility is likely), country-specific early warning (when fragility is likely), and country-specific fragility (why/how countries are fragile). He deconstructed the myth that eliminating “root” problems will solve the problem, and then he discussed design and implementation. There is an unrealistic and harmful risk, he argued, that policies will attempt to do everything, everywhere, at once. Rather, there is a need for consensus on priorities, beginning with security. Another necessity is that of coherence among donor/NGO projects, as it can cause excessive activity in some countries and lack of activity in others. Moreover, lack of consistent funding leads to reactive policies and “ambulance chasing”, rather than preventive action. The presentation concluded with a description of an experiment to put together a proactive peacebuilding strategy in Guinea-Bissau. One main result was uncovering a constant struggle among elites; rather than having ‘root causes’ where problems flow up into a metaphorical tree, the country was experiencing “rotting leaves” where the problems flowed down into the roots.

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*Compare for example the disparate rankings for Pakistan in the 2006 and 2007 editions of the Fund for Peace Failed States Index and then consider CIFP’s ranking in Carment, D., Prest, El-Achkar, S. and Samy, Y. “The 2006 Country Indicators for Foreign Policy: Opportunities and Challenges for Canada” in Canadian Foreign Policy Journal (Winter 2006). In 2006, FFP ranked Pakistan 9th on their list, while in 2007, Pakistan ranked 12th (FFP 2006, 2007). While the FFP list may provide some information regarding the relative level of violence in the state, it is unclear what else could drive such a shift in rankings. Moreover, by focusing on failure as its dependent variable, such an index provides little basis for any sort of forward-leaning policymaking, as it provides more information about where crises are currently occurring than when and where they may emerge.*
The keynote spurred a discussion that raised a number of points:

- When government and NGO join together, there are problems when that joining is considered an “all of government” approach with the rest (i.e. NGOs) being “along for the ride.”
- Treating initial causes as a solution to current problems is often insufficient and inappropriate, particularly given that initial causes can transform over time.
- Although many agree about the need for coherence, the policy choice appears to be random as to when a country goes from being an orphan to being a focus country.
- Canada is currently attempting to distance itself from previous investments in early warning and risk analysis.
- The export of western models often involves distortions. Given that our own country often experiences conflict, (which is normally managed rather than devolving into violence) why do we tell other states to not have conflict. There needs to be clarity on the distinction between violence and conflict.
- Since most conflicts occur in highly complex environments, most actors find it difficult to adopt a strategic forward looking approach without some leadership and direction. Many actors react rather than prevent.
- “3D” is taking away some of the NGO ability to work effectively, because it detracts from agency independence and neutrality.

Panel 1: Methods and Modes of Analysis and Assessment of Risk

Carrie Vandewint provided an overview of World Vision’s (WV) tools for conflict analysis, which was divided into three levels. First, at the micro (community) level, WV assesses local capacities for peace, which analyses the presence and role of “dividers” and “connectors.” The next micro-level step is to assess the effect of NGO projects and how the projects can enhance connectors and reduce dividers. The second, macro, level is usually carried out through a workshop or consultant will work with key informants in order to analyse the seven components of “making sense of turbulent contexts.” Finally, at the international level, WV uses the fragile state index and human development index to ensure that a country strategy is properly tailored to specific conditions within countries.

Participants elicited several questions and comments:
- In Sri Lanka, the mapping has been used for recommendations on evolving programming
- The method demonstrates how various tools can be used together.
- WV, like other agencies, has been constrained in its activities and have had to work around conflicts rather than on them.
- Each agency takes the tools, using and manipulating them towards a certain objective rather than keeping them pure and objective.
- Lenses have frames; taking a security lens to an international frame will have a different result.
- Each organization needs to have its own set of tools; there is an impediment to using the same tools – and using them together – because of organizational behaviour.
- Further problems arise when organizations use indices whose methodology they do not understand (see reference footnote 2 on the misuse and abuse of the FFP index for example).
• Organizations, including those within government departments, tend to absorb original research and ideas and call it by a different name; this results in a low degree of organization, a lack of information management and generates further stovepiping.  

• There is a concern that discourse is about ownership. Although there is a common view that information sharing is good, many groups may be using a tool that was created for a different purpose. There needs to be training associated with the use of specific analytical tools.

• Changing frameworks in midstream before full implementation has serious effects. For instance, human security used to drive funding, and now the framework has shifted towards national security. How is civil society to make sense of these sudden changes in investment in ideas, tools and concepts?

Panel 2: Project Design and Implementation

Robyn Baron began the panel on Project Design and Implementation with a presentation that emphasized the importance of Oxfam’s rights-centred perspective which leads to the organization’s focus on long-lasting solutions, fostering of alliances and cooperation with partners. The key question addressed was “what is a fragile state and does it even matter for Oxfam’s decision making process?” Fragility as a concept facilitates Oxfam in conceptualizing processes and the engagement with actors.

The presentation proceeded to an illustration of Oxfam’s project cycle which begins with a situation analysis that leads to the formulation of objectives and the creation of an action plan that is implemented. Projects are monitored throughout the implementation phase and finally evaluated against the initial objectives. The country strategic planning process allows all Oxfam offices, partners and communities to participate in long-term planning. During the contingency planning process, fragility and risk analysis allow Oxfam to plan for major crises that can affect in-country operations. This analysis will rely on a variety of categories of information and will include the creation and evaluation of scenarios. Throughout the planning process, Oxfam focuses on the macro level for its analysis and planning. The presentation concluded by pointing out the problematic interaction between Oxfam’s advocacy focus, the planning process and on-the-ground operations.

The Q&A period focused on the following themes:

• There are possible entry points for fragility analysis in Oxfam’s risk assessment stage: such an analysis would allow organizations to evaluate how their operations could be affected by long-term developments.

• A central problem is that organisations do not have the time to engage in long-term analysis but require information that facilitates immediate decision-making.

• There exists a disjuncture between organisations’ need for information, the timeliness of information and the ability to engage in long-term partnerships because of the shortage of resources (financial/human resources/time).

3 For a full discussion of this issue and ideas on how to move forward see the Ottawa Branch’s CIIA Roundtable on Fragile States Report (Spring 2007).
• Organisations could benefit from coordinating the production and dissemination of risk assessments which would maximize the utility of limited resources.
• Such detailed analysis can add a new dimension to the coordination between field operations and planning. In order to take such a step, the need exists for internal organizational leadership to facilitate the implementation of strategic-level risk assessment.
• Local capacities for research and analysis could enhance the usefulness of information, particularly for field operations.
• Independent analysis can enhance NGOs ability to interact with host governments while avoiding to be perceived to undermine authorities.
• It was suggested that donor governments can play an important role in providing a supportive environment for NGO coordination.
• Complex environments such as Afghanistan place governments in situations in which they require extensive analysis that enhances their own operations as well as that of partner NGOs. There is a perception that 3-D coordination is slowing down the production and distribution of information to partner NGOs.

Panel 3: Measurement and Evaluation

David Carment’s presentation focused on two central questions: 1) what conditions must be in place to ensure the desired end state? 2) what methodologies can be employed to measure actual impact? At a minimum, evaluation and impact assessment should focus on mitigating future negative consequences for on-the-ground operations. Additionally, successful assessment will contribute to avoiding situations where capabilities do not match in-field realities. In this process, structural data and event monitoring can contribute to improved impact assessment by allowing for easier identification of entry points through multi-dimensional analysis.4

During the panel, questions were raised about who controls information that is posted online and how such information reflects the bias of those producing it. It was noted that all reporting mechanisms have built in bias especially if they reflect the views of a single analyst. From an end user’s point of view, casting as wide a net as possible, which means a combination of structural risk analysis combined with event monitoring and field reports will help maximize the accuracy of the analysis.

Issues raised during the Q&A period included:

• By tapping into the network of highly capable Canadians overseas, organizations may improve their ability to conduct more effective impact assessments and monitoring.
• It was noted that the Canadian government has a tendency to invest in a broad variety of tools and then often abandons them.

4 For a full and complete discussion of how to evaluate the circumstances and form of Canadian involvement in fragile states including impact assessment see: www.carleton.ca/cifp.
• NGOs and governments may be very reluctant to having their operations objectively evaluated by externals even if they recognize the need for improved performance and coherence in what they do. Hence, it is essential to overcome internal bureaucratic and attitudinal constraints.

• It is important to strike a balance between widely distributed information and the quality of such information. Open source information is valid and useful for conducting impact assessment. It constitutes over 80% of what is used by the intelligence community for example.

• NGOs need to set out very concrete objectives in order to be able to assess impact and make decisions about exit strategies. However, impact assessment of complex, long-term objectives is an arduous undertaking. Impact assessment requires a much better sense of matching capability to objectives, costed options and an understanding of the risks inherent in any specific strategy.

• All projects have moments of evaluation when progress is reported back to funding agencies and these can, but do not have to be, indicator based.

• As most projects are externally audited, they are subjected to detailed scrutiny. Its not clear if projects are audited on the basis of the expected impact or less ambitiously on whether funds were allocated in line with the terms of reference.

• Operational agencies may be less reluctant to admit that projects went wrong rather than conceding they did not do anything.

• Many evaluations are focused on assessing the impact on the people directly involved by looking at communities and beneficiaries. Surveys and field reports can contribute to impact assessment in this regard.

• Long-term operations have long-term often difficult to discern impacts. However, most evaluation approaches (tied to political mandates and funding) tend to take snapshots and rarely take into account such long-term developments.

Panel 4: Lessons Learned/The Way Ahead

Michael Koros’ concluding presentation focused on the opportunities presented by an open-source approach to the collection, analysis and sharing of information. An open source consortium such as OSER (Open Source for Effective Response) can bring together the ‘best of breed’ in an area of interest. Numerous tools already collect information on proximate triggers, structural data and provide integrated analysis. Organisations change their information providers depending on the event’s imminence. Structural data will provide information users with an issue to concentrate on and follow through over time. In order to react appropriately to proximate triggers, long-term structural data and events data – both qualitative and quantitative – need to be collected, analyzed and used in a parallel fashion.

In order for a consortium such as OSER to be financially self-sustaining, it needs to work within a long time horizon (10 years), launch pilot-projects, experience incremental growth and increased client involvement. In all of these steps, technology plays a very important role. There are four key areas that need particular attention: methods/tools, performance measures, responses, sustainability.

In an effort to discuss existing instruments, the workshop encountered that current instruments used by governments are frequently stuck in Cold War, stove-pipe, thinking. These approaches need to be expanded to allow for the inclusion of game theory, social marketing and organizational behaviour. There is
a need to define the platform that will allow for such internal changes to take place. In this context, OSER competes with other, non-rational models of decision making.

OSER needs to develop an idea of how collective information sharing can contribute to the development of a new approach to intelligence. On option is a value-oriented approach, that focuses on the monitoring of rights and is guided by the responsibility to prevent conflicts and a comprehensive sense of security for people. International NGOs should lead efforts advocating for such a change by first moving beyond inter-organisation competition. Open source information sharing can facilitate the managing of multiple goals and the realization of additional opportunities. The pooling financial of resources around joint projects can facilitate the identification of common problems and creation of collective solutions.

The presentation also focused on globalization’s impact on fragility analysis. To what extent is technology helping to counter forces that are leading to state disempowerment? Technology can improve people’s ability to be heard and in turn contribute to the change of power dynamics.

The following issues were raised during the Q& session:

- Very few NGOs have the ability to pool resources as they are dependent on government funding. It takes understanding from the government and bureaucratic leadership which are often in short supply to facilitate information sharing and generate opportunities for the pooling of resources.
- NGOs are frequently constrained by reduced humanitarian space. This has increased the need for effective conflict prevention but NGOs are not necessarily properly trained in this area in terms of application of tools but also analysis and risk assessment.
- Collaboration by NGOs is often limited by their own specific goal seeking behaviour.
- NGOs are often critical of government demands to increase cooperation as they see it as a way for governments to pass the buck. By increasing NGO roles in decision making – whether it be at the analysis stage, the implementation phase or the evaluation phase, an incentive structure for increased cooperation should be created. This is the essence of whole of Canada approaches. In this regard Canada has huge investments in the development of such tools and modes of collaboration but they are rarely used.
- Paradoxically, while bureaucrats do not have sufficient time to engage in extensive conflict analysis, they are reluctant to rely on external and independent sources, unless it meets their specific bureaucratic needs. Mainstreaming may be enhanced and bureaucrats’ country knowledge could be improved through an agreed-upon framework.
- There is no need to reinvent the wheel (in terms of investing in tools and methodologies) but rather to create incentive structures that facilitate coordination.
- By creating ‘organizational champions’, who push the agenda, improved coordination can be achieved from within.
Workshop agenda

8.45: Arrival: Continental Breakfast

9.00-9.30: Welcome Address: David Lord, CPCC and David Carment, CIFP, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

Moderator: Colleen Duggan, International Development Research Centre

10.15-11.30: Panel 1: Methods and Modes of Analysis and Assessment of Risk
Presenter: Carrie Vandewint, World Vision Canada
Moderator: Yiagadeesen Samy, CIFP, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

11.30-12.45: Panel 2: Project Design and Implementation
Presenter: Robyn Baron, Oxfam Canada
Moderator: Stephen Nairne, University of British Columbia

12.45-13.45: Lunch

13.45-15.00: Panel 3: Measurement and Evaluation
Presenter: David Carment, CIFP, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Moderator: David Lord, CPCC

15.00-15.15: Coffee Break

15.15-16.45: Panel 4: Lessons Learned/The Way Ahead
Presenter: Michael Koros, CIDA
Moderator: John Siebert, Project Ploughshares
### List of participants

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Speaker and Moderator Biographies

Robyn Baron is currently with Oxfam Canada, where she has been working as a Program Officer for the Horn of Africa managing Oxfam Canada’s programs in Somalia/land since August 2006. Prior to that, she worked in the Americas with a variety of local and international NGOs including Plan International on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, CRIPDES and CORDES in El Salvador, The Marquis Project and The Sanctuary Foundation in Canada and Cuba. Robyn holds both an undergraduate degree from McGill University in International Development and Women’s Studies as well as a post-graduate diploma in International Management and Latin American studies. Her main areas of experience include gender and development, women’s rights and child protection. With her experience on the border with Haiti and her relatively recent move into the Horn and Somalia, Robyn jokes that she has received one of the best crash courses in existence on the role of risk assessment and conflict analysis in project planning and implementation.

David Carment is a full Professor of International Affairs at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University and Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI). He is listed in Who’s Who in International Affairs. In addition Carment is the principal investigator for the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy project (CIFP). He has served as Director of the Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University and is the recipient of a Carleton Graduate Student’s teaching excellence award, SSHRC fellowships and research awards, Carleton University’s research achievement award, and the Petro-Canada Young Innovator Award. He has held fellowships at the Kennedy School, Harvard and the Hoover Institution, Stanford. His website is www.carleton.ca/~dcarment. His most recent book is on Diaspora and Canadian foreign policy. (MQUP 2007).

Colleen Duggan is a Senior Program Specialist in the Evaluation Unit at the International Development Research Centre (IDRC). She has a Masters in International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law from Essex University and holds a graduate degree in International Development and Economic Cooperation from the Université d’Ottawa. Between 2001 and 2005 she worked with IDRC’s Peace, Conflict and Development Program and with its Women’s Rights and Citizenship Program. Prior to joining IDRC, she spent 10 years with the United Nations, with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia, with UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in New York and in the field with the UNDP in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti. Her research interests include human rights, transitional justice and reconciliation processes, conflict analysis and preventive action, reintegration of displaced populations and peacebuilding evaluation. She has published a number of works on peacebuilding and gender and transitional justice, most recently “Reparation of sexual violence and democratic transition: In search of gender justice” (with A. Abushsharaf) in P. de Grieff, ed. The Reparations Handbook (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) and “Reparations for sexual and reproductive violence: Challenges and prospects for achieving gender justice in Guatemala and Peru” (with J. Guillerot and C. Paz) in International Journal of Transitional Justice (upcoming 2008).

Michael Koros began his career in 1988 with the UNDP in Zimbabwe and then served with UNDP in Mozambique (1990-91), with the UN in Cambodia (1992-93), and with CARE Canada in Croatia and Bosnia (1993-94). He has also consulted with several departments of the Canadian government, with Queen's University (1997), with the Bank of Canada (1998-2000) and, with IDRC (2000), he managed a project on peace and conflict impact assessment. In 2001 he joined CIDA's South Caucasus and Central Asia
program, and since mid-2004 has been Senior Analyst for Peace and Security in CIDA’s Policy Branch. In this capacity he launched the applied research project on state fragility with Professor David Carment and the CIFP team at Carleton University, and represents the government at the OECD Development Assistance Committee’s Fragile State Group and network on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation. Michael holds B.Comm. and M.A. degrees from the University of Toronto.

**Michael S. Lund** is Senior Specialist for Conflict and Peacebuilding at Management Systems International, Inc. and Consulting Program Manager at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, both in Washington, D.C.. Dr. Lund is a specialist in how various policy instruments can address violent conflicts, with a special focus on preventing them before they start and the effectiveness of post-conflict programs and strategies. His conflict assessments, policy and operational guidance, evaluations, practical manuals, presentations, and training have been commissioned by USAID, the U.S. Department of State, the US National Intelligence Council, the C.I.A. (Political Instability Task Force, National Intelligence Council, and Global Futures Forum on Genocide), the World Bank, the European Commission, UNDP and UNDPA, OSCE, OECD-DAC, DFID, the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, the Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflicts, the IDRC, the Carter Center, International Peace Academy, and several other organizations. This work has involved leading teams to conduct country conflict assessments, designing conflict-sensitive country-specific-development programs and strategies, evaluating diverse donor programs using a conflict and peacebuilding lens in post- and potential conflict countries, and designing and conducting training workshops on these and related skills. His conflict assessments include Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Macedonia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi, and he has written on other conflict-prone countries in Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central and Eastern Europe. He formulated and is advising a multi-pronged pilot initiative in conflict prevention in Guinea-Bissau that is seeking to galvanize local and international actors to address the drivers of that country’s recurrent inter-factional conflicts and state weakness. In December 2006, he led an evaluation of UNDP’s Social Cohesion Program, which comprised a wide variety of short-term media, electoral, citizen mobilization, intra-governmental, private sector, and security sector initiatives aimed at avoiding further polarization and electoral violence in that ethnically-divided society. In 2004, he led teams in Georgia, Macedonia and Serbia to assess whether community development projects were reducing post-conflict inter-ethnic animosities. In 1998, Lund pioneered for USAID the development of conflict-sensitive evaluation criteria by designing and directing an MSI project that assessed the impacts of eight differing NGO initiatives in the Greater Horn of Africa that were aimed at mitigating conflict and building structures for peace.

His recent independent research includes “Greed and Grievance Diverted: Why Macedonia Has Avoided Inter-Ethnic Civil War,” in Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambanis, eds. Understanding Civil War (World Bank, 2005), and “Human Rights: Source of Conflict, State-Making and State-Breaking,” in Jeff Helsing, ed. Human Rights and Conflict (US Institute of Peace Press, 2006). He is co-editor and author of analytical chapters of Critical Connections: Security and Development (International Peace Academy, forthcoming 2008), which compares the interplay of security and development in seven countries (Guyana, Guinea-Bissau, Yemen, Somalia, Namibia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). He is also co-editing a book with Howard Wolpe (Talking Through Transitions WWIC Press, forthcoming 2008) that assesses six country cases of dialogue projects involving national dialogue and consensus-building among with political leaders (Sri Lanka, Estonia, Tajikistan, Cyprus, and Burundi). Lund’s book Preventing Violent Conflicts (USIP, 1996) is used in many universities and helped to stimulate several major governments to adopt conflict prevention as a policy goal. Lund holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago and has taught at
UCLA, Cornell and the University of Maryland, as well as courses at John Hopkins’ SAIS and George Mason University.

David Lord has acted as the Coordinator of the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee, a network of Canadian NGOs, institutes and individuals involved in peacebuilding policy development and programming since 2002. His previous experience in this field includes working as regional representative of The Carter Center in its efforts to implement the Nairobi Agreement between Uganda and Sudan, as a founding co-director of UK-based Conciliation Resources with responsibilities for developing CR’s grassroots peacebuilding program in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and as a volunteer and later as research director of International Alert. In Canada, he has also served as an advisor to the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs and worked for a number of media organizations as a journalist.

Stephen Nairne is an Adjunct Professor at the University of British Columbia, where he teaches courses on country and project risk analysis in developing countries. He consults regularly with organizations working in failed and fragile states and has worked previously both for Export Development Canada (EDC) and Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT). Effective November 1st, Stephen will be assuming the position of Managing Director at Lundin for Africa (www.lundinforafrica.org), a private philanthropic foundation dedicated to sustainable community development in Africa. Stephen holds a Bachelor of Commerce from McGill University and a Master of Arts from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

Yiagadeesen Samy holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Ottawa and is assistant professor of international affairs at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. His fields of specialization are international trade, international finance and economic development. His current research interests include trade and labour standards, foreign direct investment, aid and debt relief, terrorism financing and the determinants of state fragility (especially for small island developing states). Some of his recent work (authored and co-authored) has been published in Applied Economics, the Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, Canadian Foreign Policy and Perspectiva Magazine. He currently teaches courses in international trade, economic development and quantitative methods at the School of International Affairs.

John Siebert is the Executive Director of Project Ploughshares. The work of Project Ploughshares includes research and policy development on: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; conventional disarmament including the control and reduction of small arms and light weapons and armed violence reduction in development programming; peacebuilding projects in the Horn of Africa that includes work with IGAD on a peace and security architecture for the sub-region; and Canada’s foreign and defense policy with respect to North American defence (NORAD, NATO) and Canadian Forces’ expeditionary engagements. John also chairs the governance group for the international research consortium that produces the annual Space Security Index, a project managed by Project Ploughshares. Prior to joining Project Ploughshares in 2005 John worked on international and Canadian human rights and indigenous peoples’ issues, and was briefly a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of External Affairs and International Trade with a posting to Canada’s Embassy in Washington, DC.
Carrie Vandewint In her current role as humanitarian policy advisor for World Vision Canada, Carrie leads WV's policy and advocacy work on fragile states and children and armed conflict. She has been working for World Vision for over 5 years; her most recent international assignment was as World Vision’s Peacebuilding and Advocacy Manager for its South Sudan program from 2002 to 2006. She is on the Steering Committee for the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee as well as the Watchlist for Children and Armed Conflict and is the coordinator of the Sudan Inter-agency Reference Group (SIARG), a working group of Canadian civil society focusing on Sudan.
**Background Material**


CIFP Newsletter June 2007.

DFID (2005) [Fragile States -Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States.](#)


OECD (2007) [Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.](#)


CSOs in Fragile States: How Can They Contribute to Strengthening Local Civil Society and Governance?